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where the prospective law student may receive his preparatory work
before beginning the study of law. We have strong Law Schools within
our State where the proper training in law can be had, and for those
who may not attend a Law School, there can be found in most every
county, well trained lawyers who are willing to give of their time and
learning, to properly teach such students, to enable them to meet the
requirements for admission to the bar.
When Kentucky builds up this branch of learning the whole educational scheme will take on the appearance of modern progress. This
branch of learning is the last to start. It should have been the first.
It should be advanced from the rear ranks to the foremost position
which is the proper place for the lawyer.
A bill will be introduced during the first week of the next session
of the Kentucky General Assembly, setting forth in substance the above
recommendations, and all the members of the profession as well as
those who feel an interest in the profession or an interest In the general advancement of the State, should lend a helping hand In order to
secure the enactment of the bill into law.

DEED OF CONVEYANCE OF LAND IN
KENTUCKY.
By JUDGE LYMAN CHALULEY
Professor of Law, State University of Kentucky, College of Law.
The statute of Kenteucky has recognized and affirmed the operation
of the Statute of Uses in three conveyances, viz; the deed of. bargain
and sale, the deed of release, the deed of covenant to stand seised. The
statute, enacted in 1873, (Carroll' Statutes,, Sec. 491, procides:
"All deeds of bargain and sale, deeds to stand seised to use,
deeds of release and deeds of trust, shall be held to vest the possession of the grantor in the grantee to the extent of the estate
antended to be conveyed."
This statute supersedes the statute of 1843, which enacted as
follows:
(Stanton's Revised Statutes, 182, Vol. 1, P. 270):
"Conveyances by deed of bargain and sale, or deed of release,
or by covenant to stand seised to'use, or deed operating by way
cf covenant to stand seised to use, or by grant, shall be held to
transfer the possession of the bargainor, releasor, covenantor, or
grantor, to the bargainee, releasee, grantee, or person entitled to
the use for the estate or interest which he has or shall have in
the use and intends to convey."
The statute of 1843 superseded that of 1796, which was as follows:
(Littell's Laws of Kentucky, Vol. 1, P. 572):
"By deed of bargain and s.1e, or by deeds of lease and release,
or by covenant to stand selsed. to use, or deed operating by way
of covenant to stand seised to use, the possession of the bargainor,
releasor, or covenantor, shall be deemed heretofore to have been
and hereafter to be transferred to the bargainee, releasee, or per.
son entitled to the use of the estate or interest which such person
hath or shall have in the use as perfectly as if such bargainee,-
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releasee, or persons entitled to the use had been enfeoffed with
livery of seisin of the land intended to be conveyed by the said
deed or covenant."
The statute of 1796 was a re-enactment of the Virginia statute
to the same purport of 1792.
"The statute of uses of Henry VIII was a part of the colonial law
of Virginia, but the revised statutes of Virginia, since 1792, adopted
as a substitute the provisions which only execute the seisin to the use
In the case of deed of bargain and sale, of lease and release, and of
covenants to stand seised to use. The statute only executes the seisin
to the use in those specified cases, and does not, like the English statute, include every case where any person should stand s eised to the
use of any other berson." (Note to Kent's Commentaries, Eleventh Edition, Vol. 1, P. 188, citing Lomax's Digest of the laws respecting real
property.)
The statute of uses of Henry, which was a part of the laws of
colonial Virginia, and became to this limited extent a part of the law of
Kentucky by the statute of 1796 and has been continued to the present
time through the statutes of 1843 and 1873, is as follows, (redundant
expressions eliminated):
"Where any person * * * * is seised * * * * of and in
aiy lands, tenements, * * * .A or other hereditaments, to the use,
confidence or trust of any other person * * * * by reason of any
bargain sale," feoffment, fine, recovery, covenant, contract, agreement, * * * * that in every such case, all and every such person
that have any such use, confidence or trust in fee simple, fee tail,
for term of life or for years, or otherwise * * * * shall stand
and be deemed and adjudged in lawful seisin, estate and possession, of and in the same lands, tenements, or other hereditaments
* * * * to all intents, constructions and purposes in the law, of
and in such like estates as they had in the use in the same: and
that the estate, title, right and possession that was in the such
persons that were seised of any lands, tenements, or hereditaments,
to the use, confidence or trust of any such person, be clearly
deemed and adjudged to be in him or them that have such use,
confidence, or trust, after such quality, manner, form and conditions as they had before in the use, confidence or trust that
was in them."
The difference, it will be noticed, between the original statute of
uses, and the Virginia and Kentucky statutes, is that, while the
original provides for the operation of the rule in all cases where one
is seised to the use of another "by reason of any bargain, sale, feoffment, fine, recovery, covenant, contract, agreement," the latter only
does away with the necessity for livery of seisin,--or delivery of possession-in case one is seised to the use of another by reason of a
bargain and sale, lease, covenant to stand seised. Broadly, the original statute provides that where a use is raised by any form of agreement, then the possession is passed with out livery, while the Kentucky
statute.gives that operation and effect only to cases where the agreement i by bargain and sale, lease and release, covenant to stand
seised. Thus, contrary to the provisions of the original statute, no
agreement to convey but the three mentioned, i.e., bargain and sale,
lease and release, covenant to stand seised, will under the Kentucky
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statute, operate to raise such a use as will be executed by the statute
of uses, by transmutation of the posession without livery.
It will be noticed also that the original statute of Henry does not
recite the lease and release, or the release. These are first mentioned
in the Virginia and Kentucky statute of 1792 and 1796. In these
statutes are included the deeds of lease and release. In the act of
1843, the recital. is of a "deed of release." It must be noted, however,
that this statute (granting that any effect. can be given to it; it is
unintelligible) makes a radical change in the law, in t]tat it, in effect,
provides that land shall lie in grafit. If land lies in grant as well as
in livery, then the deed of release will be as effectual as any to bring
about a conveyance of the entire title. This statute was in effect from
1843 to 1873. The present statute, however, omits the words "or by
grant," but does not return to the lease and release. This leads to
a very complicated situation. It is submitted that the word "release"
in the statute of 1873 should be read in the light of its historical setting, and thus be confined to the second of the two deeds which operate
under the statute of uses by way of bargain and sale for a term which
puts the bargainee in possession, whereupon the owner of the freehold
may release to him. For which reason (if the difficulty can be solved
at all) the release would not be effectual except where the releasee
was already in possession. The release at common law does not permit of livery as the releasee is already in possession, and consequently
no question as to transmutation of possession is involved which would
warrant its being classed with instruments whose purpose is to accomplish livery of possession. See Minor and Wurtz Real Property, Sec.
976. It is certain, however, that land does not lie in grant in Kentucky
at present, (with the possible exception bf the deed of trust), and never
did lie in grant except between the years 1843 and 1873.
It is necessary to the raising of a use by any of these agreements,
that the agreement be supported by a consideration actually paid, or in
the case of the covenant to stand seised, by a good consideration. See
Graves Real Property, Sec. 115. Without such consideration, the deed
is void as a conveyance.
It will. thus be seen that the only modes by which the conveyance
of the complete title to land can be accomplished under the Kentucky
statute, without livery of possession, are confined to the agreements
to convey by bargain and sale, (lease and) release, covenant to stand
seised, and the trust, in every case, supported by sufficient consideration and reduced to the form of a deed. The transmutation of
possesion to thb bargainee is accomplished by operation of the statute
without actual delivery. Such has always been the law of the state
with the exception, perhaps, of the period from 1843 to 1873.
The "deed of trust" was included for the first time, in the statute
of 1873. It apparently is to be confined to the active trust and appears to recognize that land lies in.grant for the purpose of A conveyance in trust.
For all these instruments of conveyance there are proper "operative words," settled by long usage and recognition by the cqurts, by
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which the purport of the instrument and the intent of the parties will
be disclosed, and, when used, require no further evidence. In the case
of bargain and sale, the"words "bargain and sell": in the release, "remised, released, and forever quitclaimed": in the covenant to stand
selsed, "covenant to stand seised": in the grant, (deed of trust)
"give and grant." These specific words are not essential, but if they
are used, then further question will arise as to the purport and intent.
They may be supplied by other words, synonymous or equivalent, but
where this takes place, it gives rise to the need of evidence or construction. .That the forms of these deeds in common use at the dates
of the enactments are thereby made statutory forms can hardly be
doubted. That the exact form shall be followed, however, is not essential under the peculiar wording of the statute which, at most, is
permissive. The more difficult question presents itself: What is such
a substantial compliance with the usual form as to phraseology and
structure as will meet the requirement?
In the case of HOWE vs. WARNOCK, 4 Bibb, 234, decided in
1815, the form of the instrument was as follows:
"That the said W has bargained and sold to the said H a
certain tract of land lying in Greenup county on the Little Sandy
river, which said tract of land, the said W pays the said H as
locator, and hereby conveys, etc."
The question raised was whether there was any consideration
sufficient to support a bargain and sale. The court held that the word
"pays" imports a valuable consideration, and sustained the instrument
as a bargain and sale. In order to reach this conclusion, however,
the court took judicial notice that it was customary to "pay" for the
services of a locator in land; and also presumed, that the recital necessarily Indicated such a transaction In this case-both violent assumptions at best. The word "pays" imports a past or executed consideration and a discharge of the obligation arising therefrom which would
not be sufficient to support a present agreement to convey upon a
present consideration.
In BEALLE vs. SCHOAL, 1 Mar. 475, decided in 1819, the instrument was:
"Whereas, I, W. B., hath this day sold unto S, two half acre
lots in Bardstown, etc."
The court held that this was an acknowledgement by B that he
had sold, from which acknowledgement, there was to be inferred, a
contract to convey. The court illustrated its position by the expressions
In comon use that a man has "sold and conveyed" and "sold but not
conveyed." This implies that the conveyance is an independent act on
the part of the grantor, apart from, and in addition to, in furtherance
of, his contract to convey; that is, that the grantor, must first make a
contract to convey, and then by some act of his own, bring about the
actual transmutation of posession. The court said: "The instrument
certainly is not as explicit as it might have been: but we think the recital by Bealle, that he "hath this day sold unto Thomas Schoal two half
acre lotg" must be construed to amount to a covenant to convey the lots.
Whatever may be the accept.tion of the term sold when used in a tech-
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nical sense, it is clear, that in its popular acceptation it implies, when
used in relation to real estate, that there'was a contract to convey. And
hence we hear it said every day, not only by the unlearned, but by
the learned, that a man has "sold and conveyed" or that he has "sold,
but has not conveyed."
Thus, plainly using the terms sold and conveyed, contradistinguished from each other, and referring, by a former,
to the executory, and by the latter to the executed contract. When,
therefore, Bealle says he had sold, he must be understood to mean that
he had agreed to convey, and not, as contended by his counsel, that he
had conveyed."
Such a holding is founded upon a total misapprehension of the
operation and effect of the deed of bargain and sale. The conveyance,
that is, the transmutation of posession, follows the contract to convey,
by operation of the statute, and is not the act of-the grantor. Both
this case and that of HOWE vs. WARNOCK seem to proceed upon the
theory that land lies in grant which was not the case at that time.
In the case of PATTERSON vs. CARNEAL, 3 A. K. Marshall, 618,
decided in 1821, the circumstances were these. Patterson was mortgagee of lands mortgaged to him by C. P secured a decree of foreclosure, but before the commissioners acted, P endorsed on a copy
of the decree "for and in consideration of the full amount, specified
in the foregoing decree paid to me by'James Coleman in his individual
capacity. and not as administrator, I do hereby transfer, assign and
convey, to James Coleman, all my rights, title, claim and .interest in
the said decree and all my right and title in and to the mortgage and
the mortgaged property therein specified, and do hereby authorize
the said James Coleman, in my name and for me, to act in the premises
as I might, or could do, i1 personally present, and to make use of my
name in any legal manner that may be deemed necessary for the purHere the court
pose of obtaining the amount of the said decree."
held unequivocally that the word "convey" constituted a grant and
accomplished a transfer of the title and posession to Coleman. But
land did not lie in grant at that time.
In: YOUNG vs. RINGO, 1 T. B. Mon. 30, decided in 1824, the
deed used the words "and the said R. in consideration of the services
* * * * doth hereby give, grant and convey, unto the said M and J
and their heirs, jointly * * * * " The court said:
"Thaf the instrument in question must have the effect of conveying the legal title, cannot, we think, admit of a reasonable
doubt. It is not, indeed, drawn with technical skill, nor clothed
in all the formalities which an.artful scrivener would have bestowed upon it; but the intention of the partie to convey the
legal title is obvious, and the words used are apt and sufficient
in law for that purpose. The words employed, "give, grant and
convey," are as comprehensive as any which could have been employed, and are as efficient in law to transfer the title."
There is no pretense in this case of the conditions necessary for
the operation of the statute, and it cannot be construed otherwise'than
as a grant. Moreover neither the form of the bargain and sale nor
the statute requires any expression or exhibition of intention to make
a conveyance. The word "intended" in the statute, qualifies land, but
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has no reference to any state of mind on the part of the grantor essential to the operation of the conveyance. The statute will operate in
invitum.
In the case of BRECKINRIDGE vs. ORMSBY, 1 J. J. Mar., 224,
decided In 1829, the court indicates the same view when it says:
"In this country, there is no livery of seisin. A deed, when
delivered, passes the whole right, has the same effect here to pass
the title, that a feoffment with livery had in feudal times."
That each of the deeds mentioned in the statute will have this
effect by force of the statute, is undoubtedly true; but that any deed,
ex vi termini, will have this effect, is not warranted.
In CHILES vs. CONLEY'S Heirs, 3 Dana, 21, decided in 1834, the
instrument was:
"For value received, I bargain and sell unto Arthur Conley,
my whole right of improvement made by John Brown and all the
lands as far as Thomas Miller's claim. Given under my hand- and
seal, this the 7th day of.February, 1806.
(Signed)
WILLIAM BRIDGES.
(SEAL).
JOHN ROBINSON
THOMAS BOYD.
The court said:
"The literal import of this writing is that- of an executed
agreement or conveyance of the title which the vendor held. It
contains all the essential requisites of a conveyance in fee simple.
It is informal and unusually summary, when compared with the
redundant, quaint, and prolix style of modern conveyances by
deed * * * * It is sealed and signed and attested properly; it
shows a valuable consideration; it identifies the -parties; describes
the land and acknowledges an absolute executed sale in fee of
the vendor's right. These constitute a deed of conveyance; and
* * * * this court cannot-by any allowable process of interpretation, give to it any other character or effect than those of a deed
of bargain and sale."
Apparently a modest and true deed of bargain and sale, pure and
simple, operating under the statute, caused doubts on account of its
singularity.
In the case of FRY vs. SMITH, 2 Dana, 38, decided in 1834,
the instrument purporting to be a conveyance as well as can be made
out from- the report, "grants and conveys the land to the Vaughans
and Fiatt, to be held by them and their heirs, -to their own proper use
and behoof, with a declaration on the part of the Vaughans that their
names are used in trust only, and to and for the use of Fiatt." Thefe
were two Vaughans. The purchase price was paid by Fiatt alone.
From the meager statement by the court, it is impossible to arrive at
any fair understanding of the material facts. But enough appears to
show that if the deed contained the words "grant and convey," the
court proceeded on the theory that land lay in grant. If the conveyance was by a sufficient bargain and sale, indicating a use in Fiatt. in.
the two-thirds coziveyed to the Vaughans, then there was here a use
upon a use and the court properly refused to execute the second use.
The case is instructive as showing that the court was still of the opinion that land lay in grant; and also, inferentially, that the court
would enforce the principle of the statute of uses in a proper case.
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There is a distinct lull In the controversy abo~t the sufficiency of
the deeds of conveyance from this time until 1892. It will be remembered that in 1843, the second statute was enacted which declared, in,
effect, that land lies in grant. This was, no doubt, a legislative declaration of the law to be what had been repeatedly laid down by the
courts. Very few questions of sufficiency could arise under such a
statute. If the words "grant and convey" or their equivalent, were
used, the statute would operate or the possession be transferred by
force of the statute. The statute is, however, unintelligible by reason
There is no
of the addition of the words "and intends to convey."
subject to the verb "intends."
The statute has not been construed
by the court, which might, without too great stretch, disregard these
last words. In such a form, there are two changes to be noticed: The
introduction of the words "or deed operating by way of covenant to
stand seised to use," and the words, "or by grant."
As the "grant"
does not require either consideration or the effect of the statute of uses
to effectuate a transmutation of possession, it is plain that the legislature mistook the meaning and operation of the statute of uses and the
statute of 1796. There is no such relationship between the deeds of
bargain and sale, lease and release, and covenant to stand seised, on
the one hand, and the "grant" on the other, as to warraiit their being
grouped together. It would be difficult to escape the conclusion that
the legislative intent was to carry into effect by enactment what had
already been decreed by the courts, in effect, namely, that land lies
in grant as well as livery. It will throw light upon the controversy
that Virginia, about the same time, enacted that lands should lie in
grant as well as in livery.
This statute of 1843 was superseded in 1873 by the present statute,
which omits the objectionable features of the former enactment dnd
returns to the form of that of 1796 except that it retains the "release"
instead of "lease and release" and inserts "deeds of trust." This statute,
as well as the preceeding, the courts do not seem to have taken
seriously.
In the case of DUMESNIL vs. DUMESNIL, 92 Ky. 526, decided
in 1892, the court said:
"The English doctrine of uses, and as introduced into this
country, is very complicated and many of its rules exceedingly
technical. We shall not attempt to review them, although the
counsel for appellants have done so in an interesting brief showing
great research and learning. The law upon this subject has been
greatly simplified by decisions and statutory provisions. For the
most part, the refined instinctions of the ancient law as to conveyances of different descriptions have been swept away and technical
rules relating to them are no longer in force.
"Thus, the general statutes, ch 24, sec. 3, provides, (Carroll's Statutes, 1909, sec. 491):
"This statute swept away all the ancient and technical distinctions between the different kinds of conveyances as to the
transmutation of possession."
It is fortunate for Judge Holt's reputation that his remarks
were only obiter, and the evidence of the generosity of a kind heart
which bleeds at being compelled to laugh out of court misguided
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counsel who insist upon pestering the court with the results of great
research and learning. The question was not whether "the law upon
this subject has been greatly simplified in this state by decisions and
statutory provisions," but how such simplifications affected the law
governing the cause, and counsel were entitled to a fair hearing upon
that.
In E. J. COAL COMPANY vs. JONES, 141 Ky. 306, decided in
1910, the facts were that in February 1889, three of the heirs of R (all
married) out of five heirs, united (but without joining their spouses) in
a conveyance to Bays -of their interest in their ancestor's land. There
were other conveyances also imperfect and defective as conveyance of
the whole title. In 1896, all the five heirs united in one deed which had
the following recitals:"Now in order to correct and make good said conveyances,
they each, together with their respective husbands and wives, join
in this deed * * * * now, therefore, in order to corect all errors
and imperfections in former deeds made by any of the parties of
the first part herein, and K, party of the second part,-Witnesseth,
that parties of the first part, have sold, and by these presents,
grant and convey, to the party of the second part, and his heirs,
all our respective interest and etc."
The court said:
"A deed need not contain words of conveyance. It Is sufficient
if it contains other wozds of equivalent meaning, and when the
writing recited the making- of a former deed and then sets out
that it is made to correct and 'make good the former deed, this is
all that is required" * * * 0 and, "But the recital of an agreement in a deed, is, in law equivalent to an agreement made by the
deed, and hence it is said that upon such -recited agreement, an
action of covenant will lie. (Quoting Bank of Kentucky vs. Vance,
4 Litt. 168.)
And, "While the language used does not purport
a conveyance of the Bays land (deed of 1889) by this instrument;
it constitutes a statement in writing that they have sold and conveyed the land to Bays, and they stipulate that. they join with
their husband in this deed, in order to correct and make good the
previous deed. Mrs. Jones could not demand from Bays the land
that she had sold to him without returning the consideration
which he paid her, and so this money which was then in her
hands, was a sufficient consideration to support the agreement contained in the writing in question."
The language and position of the court are .'ar from being free of
difficulty, but it reasonably appears that the purpose of the court was
to work out an agreement to sell supported by a valuable consideration, in other words, a bargain and sale, which would operate under
the statute to carry the possession. The success of the judge in making
out a sufficient agreement may be open to question, but the words and
reasoning of the opinidn, disclose the old vice of supposing that the
conveyance is a thing to be done by the grantor separate and apart
from the agreement to sell. The conveyance of the possession is, of
course, accomplished through the operation of the statute, and not
through the act of the party and even if the agreement is established,
the consideration was a past one and would not support a present
agreement. Moreover, there was no consideration ever paid to the
husband and wife who did not join in the deed of 1889 and the posi-
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tion of the court fails as -to them. It seems more consistent that the
parties granting intended a release, which, upon the authority of
Conn's Heirs vs. Manifee, 2 A. K. Mar. 396, will operate as a bargain
and sale if supported by a consideration, or at common law and under
the statute, will carry over the possesion without consideration.
From this survey, it appears that the judicial mind has been uniformly obsessed, from the beginning to the present, by the false premise that a deed in any of the forms mentioned in the statute is in itself
a'conveyance and conveys. In fact, the deed and its efficiency to bring
about a transmutation of possession are distinct and separate processes.
The deed is essential to set up the conditions under which the statute
conveys, and, those conditions being established, the statute alone
brings about the conveyance. The deed is the form in which the law
requires a contract to convey, executed on one side by payment of the
consideration, to be clothed. This being established, the legislature
declares through the statute that the actual conveyance takes place.
The use of the word "convey" in such a deed can only have the effect
to indicate the intention of the parties to have the statute act, which
Is entirely superfluous, as the statute will act under the proper conditions whether the parties intend it or not. It is the will of the
legislature that brings about the conveyance and not that of the parties.
The declaration of the legislative intent removes the necessity for any
act oYr ceremony or declaration by the parties. The grantor contracts;
the legislature conveys.

THE NEW FEDERAL EQUITY RULES.
The new rules of practice for the United States Courts of Equity,
which have been in preparation for more than a year, became effective
February 1, 1913. This is one of the most important changes in procedure that has ever been made. Judge Amidon of the District of
North Dakota, calls the attention of the profession to the importance
of the change in rules:-"The new rules as a whole, constitute a
splendid piece of constructive work. They will be a vital force in
the courts whose practice they define. After they take effect, counsel
cannot safely take a single step in an equity cause without consulting
their provisions."
The rules superseded were those of 1842, which have stood almost
wholly unchanged for three quarters of a century, although they themselves had been for-the most part an elaboration of the first Federal
Equity rules adopted in 1822.
The ordinary practitioner has had to brush up his knowledge
of this special practice for every case on the equity side in the Federal Courts, doubling his labor. He will scarcely be relieved of this
burden by the new rules, though it may be lightened. The rules just
adopted tend to simplicity and the elimination of delay by doing away
with many of the technicalities which have obstructed the direct,

